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ABSTRACT
Intel has introduced a trusted computing technology, Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extension (SGX), which provides an isolated and se-
cure execution environment called enclave for a user programwith-
out trusting any privilege software (e.g., an operating system or a
hypervisor) or firmware. Nevertheless, SGX is vulnerable to sev-
eral side channel attacks (e.g. page-fault-based attack and cache-
based attack). In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical side
channel attack in SGX, interface-based side channel attack, which
can infer the information of the enclave input data. The root cause
of the interface-based side channel attack is the input dependent
interface invocation information (e.g., interface information and
invocation patterns) which can be observed by the untrusted priv-
ilege software can reveal the control flow in the enclave. We study
the methodologywhich can be used to conduct the interface-based
side channel attack. To illustrate the effectiveness of the interface-
based side-channel attacks, we use ourmethodology to infer whether
tracked web pages have been processed by the SGX-assisted NFV
platforms and achieve the accuracy of 87.6% and recall of 76.6%.We
also identify the packets which belong to the tracked web pages,
with the accuracy of 67.9%and recall of 71.1%. We finally propose
some countermeasures to defense the interface-based side channel
attack in SGX-assisted applications.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Establishing a trusted execution environment (TEE) is one of the
most essential security requirement, as we cannot fully trust the
underlying computing platforms, such as possible compromised
privilege software (e.g. the operating system and hypervisor) and
public cloud platforms. Several expressive cryptographic schemes
have been proposed to provide trusted computingmethods on pub-
lic cloudplatforms. Fully homomorphic or functional encryption[17,
19, 51] can be used to perform computations directly on the en-
crypted data. However, these methods are either pretty slow[41]
or basically weak[21, 39, 42] . Consequently, new hardware-based
primitives, such asARMTrustZone[2], TrustedPlatformModule[20],
and Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX)[35] have been proposed
to realize TEEs. Especially, Intel SGX which can provide a secure
enclave environment for executing critical codes over sensitive
data has received a lot of attention because of its flexibility and
availability. Several large Cloud service providers such as Google
Cloud[13],MSRAzure[45] and IBMCloud[52], have supportedSGX
on their Cloud services.
The SGX hardware guarantees that the application memory is
secured and any privilege software cannot access the application
content. However, SGX-assisted applications rely on the operating
system(OS) for system services, such as memory management and
scheduling, which will produce side channel that can be exploited
to infer the information of enclave data and codes. Several kinds of
side channels have been proven to have the ability to leak the infor-
mation of enclave codes and data, such as cache[7], page-fault[50],
branch target buffer (BTB) and last branch record (LBR)[31].
In this paper, we first present a new kind of side channel attack,
called the interface-based side channel attack in SGX, which can
be exploited to infer the information of enclave input data. The
root cause of the interface-based side channel attack is the observ-
able enclave interface (ECALL/OCALL) invocation patterns (e.g.
interface parameter sizes and invocation delay etc.) determined
by different enclave input data. By collecting and analyzing en-
clave interface patterns exposed to underlying OS during execu-
tion, we can infer the information about enclave input data. Then
we will illustrate the methodology which can be used to conduct
the interface-based side channel attack, including how to collect
the enclave interface invocation patterns in the OS and analyze
the collected data.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the interface-based side chan-
nel attack, we try to infer whether tracked website pages have
been processed by SGX-assisted Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) platforms and identify the packets belonging to the tracked
website page on SGX-assisted NFV platforms[14, 15, 49, 54] which
holds the promise of protecting the privacy of processed network
traffic. Our experiment result shows that the interface-based side
channel attack can identify tracked website page with the accu-
racy of 87.6% and recall of 76.6% and identify the packets which
belong to the tracked web pages with the accuracy of 67.9% and re-
call of 71.1%, which breaks the promise of privacy preserving and
shows the severity of the interface-based side channel capability.
Finally, we proposed some countermeasures which try to eliminate
the interface-based side channels and show their effectiveness.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Wepresent a new kind of side channel attack called interface-
based side channel attack in SGX which can infer the infor-
mation of enclave input data by analyzing the observable
enclave interface invocation patterns in the OS.
• We illustrate themethodologywhich can be used to conduct
the interface-based side channel attack in SGX, including
how to collect the enclave interface invocation patterns in
the OS and analyze the collected patterns.
• To illustrate the effectiveness of interface-based side chan-
nel in SGX, we conduct the interface-based side channel at-
tack on SGX-assisted NFVplatforms to infer whether tracked
website pages have been processed by SGX-assisted NFV
platforms and identify the packetswhich belong to the tracked
web site pages.
• We finally propose some countermeasures to eliminate the
interface-based side channel in SGX and show their effec-
tiveness.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel Software Guard Extension
Intel SGX is a hardware-based mechanism which can ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of application code and data even the
privilege software or the physical access to the machine (e.g. mem-
ory bus and system bus) have been compromised. It depends on
two main mechanisms to provide the security promise. One is soft-
ware isolation mechanism which allows applications to have pri-
vate data in memory that cannot be accessed by another process,
even in the face of system privilege, cause the access is enforced
by the processor. Another is remote attestation mechanism which
allows a remote verifier to verify whether an enclave has been es-
tablished on a SGX-enabled system and the integrity of the codes
running inside the enclave.
Software isolation mechanism[35] is achieved by the new in-
structions provided by Intel. These instructions can be used to
create an "enclave" which is a memory region that can only be
accessed by the creator process. Each enclave is mapped to the
enclave page cache (EPC) which is a hardware encrypted address
space in main memory access controlled by the processor. The con-
tent of EPC is only decrypted inside the processor with processor-
specific keys. Thus, even the privilege software (e.g., OS and hyper-
visor) cannot access the enclave content. The enclave code always
executes in user mode, thus any interaction with the OS through
the system calls (e.g. network or disk I/O) must execute outside of
the enclave.
SGX-assisted application developers can create enclave libraries
which can be loaded into an enclave and executed by a CPU sup-
ported by SGX through using Intel’s SGX SDK[25]. Intel SGX SDK
provides a function call mechanism for SGX application by outside
call (OCALL) and enclave entry call (ECALL). A developer needs to
define the interfaces between the enclave code and other untrusted
application code. Specifically, a call into the enclave is referred to
as an ECALL, and OCALL allows enclave codes to call untrusted
functions outside. The SDK adds instructions to marshal parame-
ters outside the enclave and unmarshal the parameters and execute
the function inside the enclave for each ECALL. For each OCALL,
the added SDK codes exit the enclave, unmarshals the parameters,
and execute the untrusted codes outside the enclave and re-enter
the enclave.
Remote attestationmechanism[1] is achieved by using a challenge-
response protocol to generate a measurement of an enclave which
is signed by the processor. The measurement can be verified by
interacting directly with Intel.
By combining the software isolation mechanism and remote at-
testation mechanism, a remote party can verify the expected codes
are running in the enclave before receiving the privacy data. After
receiving the secrets, the secrets cannot be accessed by any other
part of the remote system.
However, SGX cannot defend any side channel attacks. Espe-
cially, the Intel SGX libraries run outside the enclave. Thus any
enclave invocation patterns can be observed by the OS, which can
be exploited to infer the information about enclave input data.
3 ATTACK
3.1 Threat Model
Our thread model is based on the original threat model of In-
tel SGX, which assumes the attacker can compromise the OS and
exploit the OS to attack the SGX-assisted applications.
First, the attacker can install user level hooks into the untrusted
part of a running application which uses enclave interfaces for
trusted operation or into the Intel SGX SDK to collect the infor-
mation about the enclave interface invocation patterns.
Second, the attacker can control the unit of data sent into the
enclave once a time. This is reasonable because the applicationwill
process data in a smaller unit when there is not enough data for
batch processing, which can help us collect fine-grained enclave
interface invocation patterns, and thus reduce the noises.
Third, the attacker can configure boot properties of themachine,
such as running the victim codes on an isolated core, reducing
the CPU running frequency and eliminate the eliminable interrup-
tions, which help us measure the enclave interface invocation de-
lay more precise.
Fourth, the attacker can analyze a target enclave program’s source
codes and/or binary codes in detail to obtain the required informa-
tion. Unobservable code (e.g, self-modifying code) is outside the
scope of our attack.
3.2 Attack Overview
In this section, we illustrate the overview of the interface-based
side channel attack against the Intel SGX. Our attack mainly in-
cludes online phrase and offline phrase. The online phrase is re-
sponsible for interface invocation pattern collection of training data
and algorithm design and training. And the offline phrase is respon-
sible for input data inferring.
In the pattern collection part of the offline phrase, an attack
should collect interface invocation patterns for each input data
when they are processed by an SGX-assisted application. For a
dataset D, the attack construct a profiling dataset P, each data in P
can be represented as a vector d = [f1, f2, ..., fn]. fi represents the
interface-based side channel information collected by an attacker
when the data d is processed by an SGX-assisted application. The
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fi needs to be selected carefully, which can represent useful infor-
mation about enclave input data in different scenarios.
In the algorithm design part of the offline phrase, we need to
design or select algorithms A which can use the profiling set to
infer the information about new input data information. Accord-
ing to different scenarios, we may need to design different algo-
rithms, which has been well studied in the fields of machine learn-
ing. For example, to train the input data with label, we may need
to choose supervised learning algorithms, such as k-Nearest Neigh-
bor (KNN) or Decision Tree. To train the input data without label,
we may need to select unsupervised learning algorithms, such as
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) or Generative Adversarial
Nets (GAN).
In online phrase, we collect the interface invocation patterns
during the processing of datad
′
= [f
′
1 , f
′
2 , ..., f
′
n]. And feed the data
d
′
to the trained model A to infer the information about enclave
input data.
However, to conduct the interface-based side channel attack suc-
cessfully, we need to overcome some challenges. First, we need
to know all kinds of interface-based side channel information ex-
posed by the SGX-assisted applications, which reveal the enclave
input data information. Second, we need to collect these interface-
based side channel information precisely.
3.3 Interface-Based Side Channels
The Intel SGX libraries are responsible for routines of invoking
ECALLs from untrusted codes and routines of invoking OCAlls
inside of the enclave, which is under control of the OS. Thus the
OS can collect the information about the enclave interface invoca-
tion patterns. These information includes the names of ECALLs/O-
CALLs which are invoked when processing the input data, the size
of the parameters in the ECALLs/OCALLs and the processing de-
lay between the different ECALLs/OCALLs invocations. Combin-
ing with these information together, the attacker can infer the in-
formation about enclave input data, which we call it the interface-
based side channel attack against Intel SGX. Specifically, there are
three kinds of interface-based side channel information which can
be collected by the OS and be exploited to conduct the interface-
based side channel attack against the SGX.
3.3.1 interface invocation sequence. An applicationmay invoke
various ECALLs/OCALLs during execution. Different enclave in-
put data may cause different control flow in the program, which
displays different interface invocation sequences.
For example, the firewall needs to record some event logs when
there is traffic from the blocked addresses, which will invoke sys-
tem calls outside the enclave, such aswrite(). By observingwhether
OCALLs invokewrite()when SGX-assisted firewall processing packet,
an attacker can infer whether the IP of the processed packet falls
into the firewall’s block list.
Also, some platforms need different SGX-assisted applications
to cooperate to finish tasks. These SGX-assisted applications will
execute various ECALLs/OCALLs which will interact with each
other. Different input data may cause different ECALL/OCALL in-
vocation sequences, which can be observed by the attacker to infer
the input data information. For example, the NFV platform which
is used to processweb traffic always contains service function chain[36]
which chains different VNFs together. Some VNFs may deliver the
packets they have processed to multiple possible follow-up VNFs,
which depend on the content of the processed packets. As shown
in figure 1, if the packet which goes through the web firewall con-
tain some malicious patterns, such as "1 = 1", which may be used
to conduct SQL injection attack[22], such packets will be delivered
to Intrusion Detection System (IDS) by invoking ECALL_IDS . In
this case, the enclave interface invocation sequence is ECALL_FW ,
ECALL_IDS . Otherwise, the packet will be delivered from the web
firewall to NAT directly. In this case, the enclave interface invoca-
tion sequence is ECALL_FW , ECALL_NAT . By observing which
interface invocation sequence occurs during processing a packet,
the attacker can infer whether this packet contains content "1=1".
i n t ECALL_WF ( PKT pkt ) {
s t r i n g u r l = pkt . g e t _ u r l ( ) ;
i f ( u r l . f i n d ( " 1=1 " ) ) {
ECALL_IDS ( pkt ) ;
}
e l s e {
ECALL_NAT ( pkt ) ;
}
r e t u r n 0 ;
}
Figure 1: Example Function with input-dependent control
transfer
3.3.2 interface parameters. The data transferred from memory
to enclave is always encrypted. However, the size of the encrypted
data is not always concealed[23, 26]. The length of the ciphertext
is always proportional to the corresponding plaintext, which can
be observed when the data delivered as parameters of ECALL/O-
CALL interface. Thus the attacker can profile different input data
by the length of the encrypted input data. Specifically, there are
two kinds of side channel information caused by the enclave in-
terface parameters. The first type is the static parameter pattern
of ECALLs/OCALLs, which is the size of each parameter of the
ECALL/OCALL. The second type is dynamic parameter patterns,
which is the change of the parameter size of continuous ECALL-
s/OCALLs.
For example, different images or network packets have differ-
ent sizes, which can be exploited by attacks to profile images or
packets. In addition, some applications will change the input data,
which will cause the change of the data size. For example, the data
compression application will compress the data and change the
data size. As shown in the Figure 2, the compression function will
compress the input data data and deliver it to the codes outside
the enclave such as network I/O. By observing the size of data and
cprs_data, an attacker can infer whether the input data is text or a
picture because the gzip algorithm has the compression efficiency
which is larger than 30% for texts, but less than 5% for .png or
.jpg pictures based on our tests. Furthermore, different data always
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causes different size changes. If an attacker can know the compres-
sion ratio of different input data, the attacker can track the input
data by observing the compression ratio of the enclave input data.
i n t ECALL_CPRS ( s t r i n g da t a ) {
s t r i n g c p r s _ d a t a = compress ( d a t a )
OCALL_DLV( c p r s _ d a t a )
r e t u r n 0 ;
}
Figure 2: Example Function of Gzip Compression
3.3.3 interface invocation delay. Different enclave input data
will always trigger different program control flows, which contain
different instructions. Thus it will take different time to finish tasks
of processing different enclave input data. By calculating the time
between the invocations of ECALLs which used to start the task
and subsequent OCALLs, an attacker can know the time which is
used to process the input data. This time can be used to profile
different enclave input data.
For example, the text segments with different contents usually
need different time to finish the regular expression matching tasks.
The attack can use different regular expression matching time to
profile different text segments.
3.4 Interface Invocation Patterns Collection
To conduct interface-based side channel attack, an attack needs
to collect the interface-based side channel information mentioned
above. In this section, we illustrate how to collect three types of
interface-based side channel information.
3.4.1 collecting interface invocation sequences. To collect the in-
terface invocation sequences, we need to intercept all of the ECALLs
and OCALLs in the OS, record the invocation information and ex-
ecute the ECALLs and OCALLs subsequently.
For ECALLs, Intel SGX SDK uses edger8r tool to convert the
user-defined ECALL interfaces into the unified interface sgx_ecall()
during building. sgx_ecall() is defined in the shared library libsgx_urts.so
outside the enclave, with a parameter distinguishing different ECALLs.
Thus we use run-time interpositioning[8] to intercept the calls to
sgx_ecall() from untrusted codes. We set the LD_PRELOAD envi-
ronment variable to our own shared library which has the same
name as libsgx_urts.so and contain a function with the same func-
tion declaration as the real sgx_ecall(). In our fake sgx_ecall(), we
record the parameter which distinguishes different enclaves and
ECALLs, record the CPU clock cycle and then call the real sgx_ecall()
to enter the enclave.
As for OCALLs, we need to use a different way to intercept them,
which we call it ocall_table hijack. The OCALLs are invoked in-
side of the enclave. Thus every time an ECALL is invoked, the
sgx_ecall() will use the parameter ocall_table to indicate the ad-
dresses of the OCALLs which can be invoked by codes inside of the
enclave. As shown in figure 3, the ocall_table contains nOCALL ad-
dresses. We construct a data structure hjk_ocall_table in the mem-
orywhose layout is the same as ocall_table. Then usehjk_ocall_table
hjk_ocall_1
…
hjk_ocall_m
…
hjk_ocall_n
rcd_fun (void * pms) 
ocall_1…
ocall_m
…
ocall_n
trampline_1
…
…
trampline_n
mov %r10, m
mov %r8, rdc_fun
jmp %r8
ocall_1
hjk_ocall_table
ocall_table
Figure 3: Ocall_Table Hijack
to replace the ocall_table in sgx_ecall(). The addresses in hjk_ocall_table
direct to corresponding trampoline codes, which record the index
of corresponding OCALL in the register and direct to our rcd_fun().
The rcd_fun() will record the CPU clock cycle, record the OCALL
index in the disk, calculate the address of the real OCALL address
and jump to it.
3.4.2 collecting parameter size. For every ECALL/OCALL, they
all use a point parameter pms to point to a structmswhich contains
their parameters. We can get pms in the register when we inter-
cept each ECALL/OCALL. But we don’t know the data structure
of each interface’s ms. However, the SGX SDK will add parameter
unmarshaling codes before the execution of ECALL/OCALL. Thus
we can analyze the source codes or disassemble the binary codes
of unmarshaling logic to gain the detail of the ms and get the pa-
rameter size.
3.4.3 collecting interface invocation delay. We use the RDTSC
instruction to record the number of clock cycles before the invo-
cation of each ECALL in our run-time interpositioning program.
We also record the clock cycles before subsequent invocation of
OCALL in our recording_function. The different between these two
number can present the invocation delay of each ECALL.
However, the system events will generate noises for delay mea-
surement. To reduce the noise, we isolate one cpu core for the ap-
plication and minimize the cpu frequency. Plus, we schedule the
the eliminable system interrupt to other cpu cores.
4 ATACK ON NFV PLATFORM
In this section, we conduct an interface-based side channel at-
tack in an SGX-assisted NFV platformwhich is used to process the
web traffic in an enterprise. In this attack, the attacker can infer
whether the tracked website pages have been visited by enterprise
hosts and identify the packets which belong to the tracked web-
sites, which breaks the privacy-preserving guarantee of such plat-
forms. For simplicity, wemainly focus on the encrypted HTTPweb
traffic in the following. However, the attack for HTTPS web traf-
fic is similar, because HTTPS also use TLS as secure transmission
protocol as the enterprise gateway does under our assumption.
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4.1 SGX-assisted NFV Platform
Network function virtualization[11](NFV) is the technology that
runs the softwaremiddleboxes in virtual machines on the standard
servers. Enterprises favor NFV to build their network for its bene-
fits such as low equipment cost and energy consumption, optimiz-
ing network configuration real time and supportingmulti-tenancy,
etc.
The public cloud is an alternative place to deploy NFV platform
in addition to enterprises’ local data centers. Outsourced NFV plat-
form has been embraced by enterprises for its enormous benefits
such as reducing the management and maintenance difficulties, re-
source elasticity, and democratizing access to middlebox services
by pay-per-use model.
However, the resources in the cloud are not under the enter-
prises’ control, there are risks of exposing the privacy of users’
traffic which goes through the VNFs in the cloud. Malicious staff
in the cloud can steal the privacy of traffic easily. Research has
also shown various attacks that can steal private data from cloud
environments[9, 43, 58]. Confronted with the untrustworthiness of
cloud platforms, SGX-assisted privacy preserving NFVplatforms[15,
23, 27, 28, 49, 54] have been proposed to protect the privacy of traf-
fic which goes through the outsourced NFV platforms.
The structure of the SGX-assisted NFV platform is shown in Fig-
ure 4, enterprises can ensure the specified virtual network function
(VNF) enclave has been initialized correctly in the cloud through
SGX remote attestation mechanism[1]. After remote attestation,
an enterprise gateway can establish a trusted encrypted channel
between the enterprise gateway and VNF enclave through secure
transmission protocol, such as TLS.When the network traffic reaches
to the enterprise gateway, it will be encrypted and redirected to
the privacy-preserving NFV platform in the cloud by the enterprise
gateway. The network I/O of untrusted OS in the cloudwill receive
and deliver all the received encrypted packets to SGX-assisted VNF.
After entering the enclave of SGX-assisted VNF, the encrypted pack-
ets will be decrypted. Then the packets can be processed by VNF
as plaintext in the enclave. Finally, the packets will be encrypted
again in the enclave and sent back to the enterprise gateway through
the network I/O of the untrusted system. Because the encrypted
packets are only decrypted in the enclave which is trusted, the pri-
vacy of the network traffic content can be ensured. But current
SGX-assisted NFV platforms fail to obscure interface invocation
patterns of the enclave, which can be exploited to conduct the
interface-based side channel attack.
4.2 Key Oberservations
There are some key observations which can be used to conduct
our interface-based side channel attack on SGX-assisted NFV plat-
form.
First, The content of a particular web page will not change in
a short time. Therefore, the content and size of request packets of
objects in the particular web site will not change in a short time.
Second, different web pages have different content such as HTML
layout, images, flashes, etc. Before the requested objects of web
pages are transmitted, most of them are split into several TCP seg-
ments with different sizes. Each web page will have some objects
 GATEWAY
ENTERPRISE
Untrusted OS
Network I/O Packets Processing
Packets Decrypting
Packets Encrypting
SGX Enclave
Figure 4: SGX-assisted privacy preserving NFV platform
which always have the stable split segments. The size and con-
tent of these segment packets are determined. Thus, these constant
packets whose contents are constant can be used to profile each
web page. Third, when one VNF processes the same packet mul-
tiple times, they will expose the same interface-based side chan-
nel information. So we can infer whether a tracked website page
occurs by identifying whether the constant packets which belong
to the website page has occurred. And each packet can be distin-
guished by the interface-based side channel information exposed
by the SGX-assisted NFV platform.
Based on the key observations and attack overview mentioned
above, we show the details of three phases of the interface-based
side channel attack on SGX-assisted NFV platforms in the next
three parts.
4.3 Offline Pattern Collection
In the pattern collection phrase, we will build profiling set P for
each tracked web pages in dataset D. Each profiling set contains n
constant packets {p0,p1, ...,pn} which can be used to identify the
tracked pages. n varies as web page changes. These packets include
all the request packets and some object response packets whose
content is decisive. We can figure out these packets by visiting
each tracked web pages n times and record the packets which ap-
pears every time. Each packetpi is represented as vector composed
by a set of interface-based side channel features { fi0, fi1, ..., fim},
m varies when the topology of the SGX-assisted NFV platform
changes. We build k profiling set P for each website page, which
contains the packets sequence information of each website page.
To build the side channel feature vector for each packet, we need
to knowwhat interface-based side channel informationwill expose
when a packet goes through each kind of VNF.
The observable interface invocation sequences on the SGX-assisted
NFV platforms include the system calls of file operations triggered
by different packets and the ECALL/OCALL invocation sequences
during the delivering of different packets. When VNFs process the
packets whose contents are suspicious or are interested in by net-
work managers, the log function will be triggered. Such log func-
tions will call the file system I/O interface to interact with the
file system. Thus, different packets will cause different disk read
or write operations. From the invocation of specified system calls,
the attacker can know that the packet contains the content which
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Table 1: Exploitable Features Exposed by Typical VNFs
VNF Interface-based Features Meaning
IP Firewall Parameter Size, Invocation Delay, Invocation Sequences Packet Size, Processing Delay, Packet Delivery Path
NAT Parameter Size, Invocation Delay Packet Size, Processing Delay
IDS/IPS Parameter Size, Invocation Delay, Invocation Sequences Packet Size, Processing Delay, Disk Read/Write
WAN Optimization Parameter Size, Invocation Delay, Packet Size Change, Processing Delay
Parental Filter Parameter Size, Invocation Delay, Invocation Sequences Packet Size, Processing Delay, Packet Delivery Path
Load Balance Parameter Size, Invocation Delay Packet Size, Processing Delay
Proxy/Cache Parameter Size, Invocation Delay Packet Size, Processing Delay
can trigger the log function. In addition, when different packets go
through privacy preserving NFV platform, they may go through
different forwarding path. For example, when the packet which
contains the suspicious content or IP addresses goes through the
WAF in Figure 7, it will be forwarded to IDS to perform deep packet
inspection. Otherwise, it will be forwarded to NAT directly. From
the different packets delivery path, the attacker can distinguish dif-
ferent packet easily.
The parameter size of interfaces on the SGX-assisted NFV plat-
forms is the size of encrypted packets which need to be copied
into the enclave. Although the encryption can conceal the content
of packets, the AES256 encryption algorithm used in TLS during
secure transmission cannot conceal the size of the packets. The
size of each encrypted packets is decisive and unique. Furthermore,
when a packet goes through some VNFswhich will change the con-
tent of the packets, the packets size will change. For example, the
WAN OPT is used to compress the content of the packet to reduce
the packet transmission delay on the internet. Different contents
will cause different size changes.
Different VNFs process packets according to their rules, so dif-
ferent packet will cause different processing logic and generate dif-
ferent processing delay. And every kind of VNFwill cause this kind
of side channel information. We represent the ECALL invocation
delay of each packet in the profiling set as a range whose lower
limit and upper limit are the shortest and the longest ECALL invo-
cation time interval duringmultiple processing. We consider a new
packet’s interface invocation delay feature matches with the inter-
face invocation delay feature of a packet in the profiling set only
if the new packet’s interface invocation delay feature falls into the
interface invocation delay range of the packet in the profiling set.
In summary, different VNF will expose different kinds of side
channel information when processing packets. Table 1 shows the
side channel information exposed by typical VNFs deployed in en-
terprise networks. Almost all kinds of VNFs expose interface invo-
cation delay information. Firewall and Parental Filter will expose
packet delivery path information through interface invocation se-
quences because these two kinds of VNFs are always connected
with IDS/IPS. Serving as amonitor, IDS/IPS, and Parental Filter will
expose disk read or write information when they log the needed in-
formation through interface invocation sequences. WAN OPT will
expose the packet size change information through size change of
interface parameters because it will change the contents of pack-
ets.
In our attack, we use the interface-based features of each VNF
shown in Table 1 to construct the feature vector of each packet.
It includes the interface invocation delay and parameter size of in-
terfaces ofWAF, NAT, IDS andWANOPT, the interface invocation
sequences of the whole platform, the write operation of IDS and
the packets size change of WAN OPT.
4.4 Offline Algorithm Design
In the algorithm design phrase, we design two algorithms to
infer whether the tracked web site pages have been processed by
SGX-assisted NFV platform and identify the packets which belong
to the tracked web site pages. Then we train the algorithm using
the profiling set P.
4.4.1 Page RecognitionAlgorithm. After gaining the feature vec-
tor p
′
i for each new packet, we need to figure out which tracked
web page this packet belongs to and store the result. To perform
this task, we create amatching progress indicator I for each tracked
web page. The matching indicator Ii for each tracked web pageWi
indicates the appearing number of each packet in its profiling set
Pi . When feature vector p
′
i of a packet matches with a feature vec-
torpi in a profiling set Pi , we will add the account ofpi ’s appearing
times by 1 and calculate the ratio of appeared packet Rappeared in
profiling set Pi using formula 1. Nappeared represents the num-
ber of packets whose appearing number in Ii is not zero. T rep-
resents the total number of packets in the profiling set Pi . When
the Rappeared reaches 100%, we can infer that the corresponding
tracked web page has been visited. In addition, we will store the
information mi about p
′
i with the index of pi in the information
buffer B. This information includes the feature vector pi , its arriv-
ing time and arriving sequence number. This information will be
used in the packet recognition. We set a 30s timer for eachmi . The
mi will be cleared when its timer is used up, which is used to save
storage resources.
Rappeared =
Nappeared
T
(1)
For example, as Figure 5 shows, after training phrase, the profil-
ing set Pi which contains four packets feature vector for tracked
web pageWi . When the matching progress indicator Ii is initial-
ized, the appearing time of all the packets are zero. Then we will
compare feature vector of the packet in the web page traffic with
feature vector in Pi one by one. After processing t packets, the
state of I has changed. And it indicate that packet p1, p2, p3, p4 has
appeared 2, 4, 3, 0 times respectively. And the Rappeared is equal
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Figure 5: Recognition Algorithm Example
to 75%. After matching the feature vector of t+1st packet with all
the feature vector in every profiling set, we find p
′
t+1 is equal to
p4 in Pi . Then the appearing times of p4 in Pi will change to 1.
And the Rappeared will change to 100%. This means the web page
presented by S has been visited.
We infer whether a tracked web page has been visited through
the variation of the value of the Rappeared . However, when the
tracked web page has been identified the Rappeared will continu-
ous remain 100%. Thus we need to clear the states produced by
packets of the identified web page. The traffic may contain the
packets which are generated by visits the same web page multiple
times and the same web page may have multiple packets whose
features vector are the same. Thus we cannot clear the value of I
naively by setting the appearing times of all packets to 0 or reduce
1 from the appearing times of each packet. We need to reduce the
times which they appear during visiting web page once from ap-
pearing times of each packet. We can get the appearing times of
each packet in profiling set through recording the appearing times
of each packet when building the profiling set. As shown in Figure
5, if the appearing times of each packet in P is 2, 2, 2, 1 respectively,
then after clearing, the I will become 0, 2, 1, 0. Rappeared changes
to from 100% to 50% correspondingly.
4.4.2 Packet RecognitionAlgorithm. After the page recognition,
we can knowwhether the network traffic of a trackedwebsite page
has been processed by an SGX-assisted NFV platform. However,
we cannot figure out whether a packet belongs to the tracked web
site page. For example, As shown in figure 5, when the Rappeared
is equal to 1, there may be 2 p1, 4 p2 and 3 p3 in the information
bufferB, we need to figure out the packets which truly belong to
the tracked website page from all these packets.
The packets which belong to the sameweb page always have the
stable relative positions in the web page traffic. For example, the
request packets usually occur before corresponding response pack-
ets. And most web pages finish their rendering in t seconds which
is the max time interval between any 2 packets in each tracked
web site’s profiling set. Thus the arriving time intervals between
the packets in the same web page traffic will less than t seconds.
We use the packets sequence properties of each tracked website
and arriving time interval of the packets in each tracked website
to identify the real packets.
The Long Short Memory Network (LSTM) is a classifier which
will consider the context when it processes each input data. Thus
we can use it to predict whether a packets sequence is legal for a
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Figure 6: Long Short Memory Network
tracked network web page. As shown in Figure 6, we can use the
packets sequence as the input of the binary classification LSTM
which can predict whether the input packets sequence is legal of a
tracked web site page. The output layer will show the probability
of whether the input packets sequence is legal. We first use the
packet sequence in k profiling sets of each tracked website page to
train their own LSTMs. Then we use all possible packets sequences
in the matching indicator Ii whose Rappeared is equal to 1 as input
to predict their legality.We add the legal packet sequence into legal
sequence set L for each tracked web site page.
Before we use each tracked website page to predict the legal-
ity of each packets sequences, we use the time interval t to filter
some illegal packets. Firstly, we compare the arriving time of each
packet in the matching indicator Ii . If the arriving time intervals
between a packet and all other packets are all large than t, this
packet must not belong to the tracked web site page. Secondly, if
the arriving time interval between any 2 packets in the sequence is
larger than t, this sequence is illegal. Finally, the packets contained
in the packets sequences left in L may belong to the tracked web
site pages.
4.5 Online Data Inferring
In the online data inferring phrase, we slow down the deliv-
ery rate between the network I/O and VNF enclave to make the
VNF process the packet in the web traffic one by one. After ob-
serving the interface-based side channel information exposed by
each VNF when packets go through the whole NFV service func-
tion chain. We can obtain the feature factor of each packets p
′
i =
{ f
′
i0, f
′
i1, ..., f
′
im}. And when we collect the side channel informa-
tion exposed by the VNFs, we need to make sure the VNF starts to
process the next packet until the previous packets have been deliv-
ered. If multiple packets are processed in VNF simultaneously, we
will not match the input packet with output packet because the
content of a packet will change after being encrypted again. Then
we use web page recognition algorithm and packet recognition al-
gorithm to infer whether tracked website page has been processed
by SGX-assisted NFV platform and identify the packets which be-
long to the tracked web pages.
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5 COUNTERMEASURES
Through the attack we conduct above, an attacker can know
that whether the tracked web page has been visited by the hosts
in the enterprise. By tracking the privacy-related website pages,
such as the particular medical web page or shopping web page,
an attacker can infer the health conditions and shopping habits
of employees in enterprises. The privacy of enterprise employees
leaks seriously, which break the guarantee of SGX. Confronted
with three kinds of interface-based side channels in SGX-assisted
applications, we propose following countermeasures to reduce the
ability of these interface-based side channels and improve the se-
curity of SGX-assisted applications. The countermeasures include
fixing the size of input data and batch operation mechanism.
5.1 Fixing Size of Input Data
Different enclave input data may have different sizes, which can
be observed as parameter size and be used to profile different en-
clave input data. For example, different web page traffic contains
packets of different sizes. Thus, the size of the constant packet in
web page traffic can be used to profiling tracked web page. To re-
duce the side channel information caused by the interface param-
eter sizes, we need to fix the size of the interface parameter size
which is various as input data change. Before the sensitive data
is encrypted and sent to an untrusted party, we pad the data to a
fixed length, which makes the ciphertexts have the same length.
There are several strategies to pad the data. For example, we can
pad the input data length to the max length of all the input data or
to x times the fixed length. n is the least positive natural number
which satisfies n ∗ x > L. L is the real length of the ciphertexts.
Different strategies have different cost and security effectiveness.
Padding the data length to the max length of all of the input data
will waste large amounts of resources, such as network bandwidth,
but leak the least side channel information, padding the size to x
times the fixed length depends on the real length of input data,
which will waste little resources but reveal more side channel in-
formation about the input data size.
Through fixing the length of enclave input data before sending
it to the untrusted party and sending them out of SGX enclave, the
interface parameter size information observed by an attacker will
be reduced. Such information will make little sense when being
used as features to identify particular enclave input data. There-
fore, side channel information of parameter size can be reduced.
5.2 Batch Operation
Confronted with side channel information of interface invoca-
tion sequences and interface invocation delay, we propose the batch
operationmechanism to reduce such information, it includes batch
data delivery and batch interface invocation.
To gain the interface invocation sequences and interface invo-
cation delay, an attack needs to process the enclave input data one
by one. If we deliver the input data in batch, these two kinds of
interface-based side channel information cannot be collected pre-
cisely. For example, we assume the batch delivery threshold is n.
With batch delivery mechanism, we can ensure that all the en-
crypted data is delivered into enclave in a batch of n data. Similarly,
only after all the n data being processed, can they be sent out of
the enclave together. By this way, all the data is processed in the
enclave simultaneously. Thus the attacker cannot know the exact
processing delay of each input data. In addition, the interface in-
vocation side channel information will also be reduced under the
batch delivery mechanism. The attacker cannot map each output
data in the batch with each input data in the batch after encrypting
the packets in enclave again. Thus the attacker cannot know the
interface invocation sequences of each input data. In terms of im-
plementation, we cannot only implement the batch delivery mech-
anism outside the enclave, because the system is untrusted. We
need to ensure that the packets are delivered in batch in the en-
clave. The batch operation mechanism in the enclave will verify
the input data to ensure that the codes in enclave will not execute
until receiving a batch of packets.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we show the effectiveness of the interface-based
side channel attack on SGX-assisted NFV platform which is used
to process the web traffic and the effectiveness of our countermea-
sures. We first describe the data set which will be used to perform
the attack and evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures. Then
we describe our experiment setup which is used to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the interface-based side channel attack and the effec-
tiveness of the countermeasures. Finally, we show the experiment
result of our attacks under different conditions and the effective-
ness of countermeasures. Through the following experiments, we
show that our attack can identify tracked website page with the ac-
curacy of 87.6% and recall of 76.6% and identify the packets which
belong to the tracked web pages with the accuracy of 67.9% and
recall of 71.1%. And our countermeasures will make the accuracy
of our attack reduce to 0.
6.1 Data Collection
To illustrate the effectiveness of the interface-based side chan-
nel attacks and countermeasures, we need to build two data sets.
One is the training data set, and the other is the test data set. The
training data set is the packet set which contains the traffic of each
tracked web pages. It is used to build the profiling set for each
tracked web page. The test data set contain the packets of both
tracked web pages and other untracked packets. It is used to eval-
uate the effectiveness of attack and countermeasures. We collect
2500 URLs from 200 famous HTTP websites from Alexa websites
rank. These websites are distributed in 10 different countries lo-
cated in 5 different continents, such as the US, England, China,
Australia, etc.
To build the training data set, we choose m URLs from 2500
URLs and visit each of tracked URLs 20 times. We use tcpdump to
collect the TCP packets whose size is larger than 100 bytes during
visiting each URL. Those packets whose sizes are smaller than 100
bytes are used to establish the TCP connection. They will not make
sense because they will not contain any meaningful contents. m
will change according to our different experiment intentions. After
building the training dataset, we can process the packets in train-
ing data set by the service function chain we built. During each
packet processed by VNFs, we can gain the side channel informa-
tion and built profiling set for each tracked web page.
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Figure 7: System architecture of privacy preserving NFV
platform used to process Web traffic
To build the test data set, we need to collect the traffic which
is generated by visiting multiple web pages simultaneously. Thus,
we choose n URLs from 2500 URLs and use tcpdump to capture
the traffic when visiting each of them twice simultaneously. The n
URLs in the test dataset include them URLs in the training dataset.
However, we cannot visit 2nweb pages simultaneously because of
our limited memory. We visit 500 URLs simultaneously one-time
using Chrome browser and repeat this procedure several times to
finish constructing traffic contain 2n web pages.
6.2 Experimental Setup
We use the topology shown in Figure 7 as the service function
chain containing typical VNFs[29, 47] which are deployed by en-
terprises to process the web traffic. When a host visits a website,
the request packets will be redirected to the NFV platform in the
cloud and go through Network Address Translator (NAT), Web
Application Firewall (WAF) andWan Optimization (WAN OPT) se-
quentially. NAT is responsible for the translation between the LAN
IP addresses and WAN IP addresses. Web Firewall is used to per-
form access control, Cross Cite ScriptïĳĹXSSïĳĽDetection, etc. To
decrease the volume of packets transmitted on the Internet and
reduce the packets transmission delay, WAN OPT is used to com-
press and decompress the Web traffic packets. After the response
packets arriving at enterprise gateway, they will also be redirected
to NFV platform on the cloud. The response packets may contain
the malicious executable codes. Thus the suspicious packets will
be forwarded to the Intrusion Detection System (ISD) after pro-
cessed by WAF. IDS will perform deep packet inspection to con-
firm whether the packet is malicious. The network setup not only
can process HTTP web traffic, when the NVF support TLS[23, 40],
it can also process HTTPS traffic. As most privacy preserving NFV
platforms[23, 27, 54], we use TLS as secure transmission proto-
col between enterprise gateway and privacy-preserving NFV plat-
form.
We implement four SGX-assisted VNFs and the enterprise gate-
way in Figure 7, including a binary trie based[44] NAT, a pattern
matching based IDS, and WAF, and a gzip-based WAN OPT. The
IDS uses 1k-5k rules. TheWAF uses 1k rules used for web attack de-
tection. The enterprise gateway and VNFs use AES 256 to encrypt
the packets when transmitted between various VNFs outside the
enclave.
All experiments are conducted on the desktop with 4 core 8
threads Intel Core i7-6700 CPU (3.4GHz) and 8GB memory, run-
ning Ubuntu 16.04 TLS and SGX SDK v2.0. We use gcc 5.4.0 to
compile the SGX-assisted VNFs. The enclave memory is set to the
maximum 128MB. Each NFV in our experiment runs as a separate
progress.
6.3 Page Recognition Performance
In this part, we will show the page recognition performance of
the interface-based side channel attack on SGX-assisted NFV plat-
forms. We will change the total amount of web pages contained in
the web traffic, the percentage of tracked web pages to total web
pages in different experiments, and the time interval between the
collection of training data and test data.We show the accuracy and
recall of identifying trackedweb pages under each condition. Accu-
racy is the percentage of web pages identified accurately in all the
identified web pages in our attack. It is calculated with the ratio of
Waccurate_identi f ied toWtotal_identi f ied .Waccurate_identi f ied
refers to the amount of tracked web pages which are identified
accurately in the attack. Once recognition is accurate only if cur-
rent information buffer B contains all the packets in correspond-
ing profiling set P.Wtotal_identi f ied refers to the total amount of
identified web pages by our page recognition algorithm. The re-
call is the percentage of web pages identified accurately of all the
tracked web pages which should be identified in the web traffic. It
is calculated with the ratio ofWaccurate_identi f ied toWtr acked .
Wtr acked refers to the total amount of tracked web pages in traffic.
To evaluate our attack performance under the circumstances
of different web pages amount, we change the number of web
pages which are visited simultaneously from 1k to 5k. Each test
dataset corresponds to a training dataset whose amount of tracked
web pages is half of the number of web pages contained in its
corresponding test dataset. Figure 8 shows the experiment results.
The accuracy and recall of our web page identifying algorithm can
reach from 84.2% to 97.1% and from 76.6% to 92.1% respectively
when the total amount of web pages in traffic varies from 1k to 5k.
The accuracy drops when the number of web pages increases. This
decline is caused by the common packets contained with different
tracked web pages. When such packets appear, our page identify-
ing algorithm will count it in every tracked web page. This will
produce some false positive. However, the result shows that such
false positive will remain less than 15.8%. Some dynamic web pages
change during the collection of training data and test data, thus
some web pages don’t be identified.
To evaluate our attack performance under the conditions of dif-
ferent ratio of the amount of tracked web pages to the number of
total web pages in traffic, we change this ratio from 25% to 100%
in the traffic containing 3k web pages. As shown in Figure 9, the
accuracy varies from 82% to 87.6%. There is no obvious changing
tendency during the change of percentage of tracked web pages in
the traffic. Thus, the performance of our tracked web page recog-
nition algorithm is independent of the percentage of tracked web
pages in the traffic.
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Figure 8: Web Pages Recognition Perfor-
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Figure 9: Web Pages Recognition Perfor-
mance(3k web pages)
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Figure 10: Web Pages Recognition Per-
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Figure 11: Packets Rocognition Perfor-
mance(50% of tracked web pages)
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Figure 12: Packets Rocognition Perfor-
mance(3k web pages)
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Figure 13: Countermeasures Effective-
ness(batch processing and 600 bytes pack-
ets size)
200 400 600 800 1000
Packet size(bytes)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
B
a
n
d
w
id
th
(G
B
)
Origial
Fixed size
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Figure 16: Countermeasures Processing
Delay (IDS with 3k rules)
Most of the web pages in our dataset are dynamic web pages,
they will change at the different time. The changing of the web
pages will influence the recall of our web page recognition. To eval-
uate the performance of our attack at the different time, we change
the time interval between the collection of training data set and
test data set. Figure 10 shows the attack performance when the
time interval varies from 10 min to 1 week. The accuracy ranges
from 85.7% to 88.9% and the recall drops from 76.6% to 43.7% with
the time interval varies from 10 min to 1 week. The decline of re-
call of our attack is caused by the dramatic change of tracked web
pages. Thus, we need to refresh our training dataset every day to
keep a stable recall.
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6.4 Packets Recognition Performance
In this section, we will show the packets recognition perfor-
mance of our interface-based side channel attack under the cir-
cumstances of the different total amount of web pages contained in
web traffic and different percentage of tracked web pages to total
web pages. We show the accuracy and recall of identifying packets
which belong to the trackedweb pages under each condition. Accu-
racy is the percentage of packets which actually belong to the iden-
tified website page in all the packets which are identified to belong
to the identified website page according to our algorithm. It is cal-
culated with the ratio of Paccurate_identi f ied to Ptotal_identi f ied .
Paccurate_identi f ied refers to the number of packets which be-
longs to the identified web site page. A packet is identified accu-
rately only if its IP address equal to the corresponding packets
in the profiling set P. Ptotal_identi f ied refers to the number of
packets which belong to the tracked website page according to our
page recognition algorithm. The recall is the percentage of pack-
ets identified accurately in all the packets of tracked web site page.
It is calculated with the ratio of Paccurate_identi f ied to Ptr acked .
Ptr acked refers to the total amount of packets of tracked web site
page.
As shown in Figure 11, When the amount of the web pages
varies from 1k to 5k, the accuracy of our packet recognition algo-
rithm varies from 63.5% to 68.3% and the recall varies from 69.1%
to 71.7%. As shown in Figure 12, when the ratio of the amount
of the tracked web pages to the amount of the total web pages
varies from 25% to 100%, the accuracy of our packet recognition
algorithm varies from 64.3% to 67.9% and the recall varies from
68.4% to 71.1%. There is no obvious changing tendency of accu-
racy and recall under these two circumstances, which means the
performance of our packets recognition algorithm is independent
from the amount of the tracked web site pages and the percentage
of tracked web pages in the traffic.
6.5 Countermeasures Effectiveness and
Overhead
We mainly propose two countermeasures against privacy leak-
age problems in SGX-assisted applications. The batch operation
mechanism will increase the processing delay because of the batch
operation verification operations in the enclave. The fixing input
data size mechanism will increase both processing delay and band-
width cost. This is caused by the padding and un-padding opera-
tions in the enclave and increased copy operations produced by the
packet padding. In this part, we first evaluate the countermeasures
against our attack, then wewill evaluate the overhead produced by
these two countermeasures.
With our batch processing and fixing data size mechanisms, fine
grained side channel information cannot be collected precisely. Al-
though the packet size can be collected in the network I/Omodules
in the OS. As shown in Figure 13. With only packet sizes which are
equal to several fixed numbers, the accuracy of our attack is almost
0% and the recall of our attack is almost 1% when fixed packet size
varies from 200 bytes to 1000 bytes. This shows that with these
two countermeasures, privacy leakage in privacy-preserving NFV
platform can be reduced to the volume which cannot make sense.
To measure the overhead of bandwidth produced by the fixing
size of packet mechanism, we measure the bandwidth consump-
tion of 5K web pages in our dataset when the fixed size of each
packet varies. As shown in Figure 14, the original bandwidth of 5K
web pages is 10.76 GB and the bandwidth consumption of 5K web
pages varies from 11.26 GB to 12.94 GB when we change the fixed
size of each packet from 200 bytes to 1000 byte. The overhead of
the bandwidth varies from 4.6% to 20%. And with only 4.6% addi-
tional bandwidth, the precision of our interface-based side channel
attack can be reduced to nearly 0.
To measure the overhead of throughput produced by our two
countermeasures.We firstmeasure the throughput of SGX-assisted
IDS with the number of rules from 1k to 5k. As shown in Figure
15, as the amount of IDS rules increase, the throughput of IDS
without countermeasures decreases from 4.32 Gbps to 3.24 Gbps.
This throughput decline is caused by the increase of IDS rules be-
cause IDS needs to spend time checking every rule. The through-
put of IDS with batch processing mechanism decreases from 4.22
Gbps from 3.2Gbps. And the overhead of batch processing mech-
anism is mainly from the batch processing verification logic in
the enclave, which is negligible. The throughput of IDS with two
countermeasures decreases from 3.8 Gbps to 3.2Gbps. This decline
mainly caused by the extra copy operations of padding data and
the batch processing verification in the enclave. Then we measure
the throughput of SGX-assisted IDS with 3k rules when the fixed
packet size varies from 200 bytes to 1000 bytes. As shown in Figure
16, as the fixed size of packets increase, the throughput of IDS with
fixing data size mechanism decreases from 3.56 Gbps to 3.15 Gbps.
This throughput decline is caused by the increase of extra copy
operation of padding data. The throughput of IDS with both mech-
anisms decreases from 3.43 Gbps to 3.08 Gbps, which is caused by
extra copy operation of padding data and processing verification
in the enclave.
7 RELATED WORK
7.1 Side Channel Attacks in SGX
Intel SGX can ensure the integrity and confidentiality of data
processing in the enclave. However, it suffers various kinds of side
channel attacks. Several works have exploited different side chan-
nel to attack SGX. Xu et al.[57] and Shinde et al.[50] demonstrate
the controlled channel attack which intentionally manipulates the
page tablewhich ismanaged by the untrustedOS to infer the secret
inside the enclave. Lee et al.[31] illustrate the branch shadowing
attack by constructing codes which share the Branch Target Buffer
(BTB) with enclave codes and observing Last Branch Record (LBR)
to infer the fine-grained control flow of enclave codes. Ferdinand
et al.[7], Moghimi et al.[38] and Schwarz et al.[46] demonstrate the
cache-based side channel attack on SGX to infer the AES keys or
RSA keys in the enclave.
7.2 Encrypted Traffic Analysis Attack
Hintz et al.[24] use the file sizes as features to identify indi-
vidual websites when the server is not known. Sun et al.[53] use
Jaccard’s coefficient to match the websites with slightly varying
sizes to pre-collected traffic patterns. However, now HTTP makes
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use of persistent connections and pipelining to meet the require-
ment of high performance, it is no longer possible to satisfy the as-
sumption that distinguishing between single web object requests
in the above works. Bissias et al.[6] performwebsite fingerprinting
base on IP packet sized and inter-packet arrival times instead of
web object sizes. Liberatore et al.[33] compared the effectiveness
of the na ÌĹÄśve Bayes classifier and JaccardâĂŹs coefficient on
SSH-protected channels. Lu et al.[34] showed that website finger-
printing can be improved by considering information about packet
ordering. However, all of the aboveworks assume that thewebsites
are visited one by one. Such an assumption is far from real which
multiple pages are visited simultaneously. The recognition meth-
ods proposed above will not work in multi-page scenarios.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Intel SGX has been considered as one of the most promising
hardware-based technology to realize the TEE. However, it suf-
fers from various side channel attacks. In this paper, we explored a
new kind of side channel attack against Intel SGX, called interface-
based side channel attack, which can infer secret information con-
tained in the enclave input data. We also propose some counter-
measures to reduce the exposure of interface-based side channel
information during program executing.
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